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Executive Summary 
The 2016-2017 CTSC-OSiRIS collaborative design review of OSiRIS Access Assertions produced a 
set of security recommendations documented in this report that the OSiRIS project plans to 
implement in its deployed cyberinfrastructure. CTSC identified no significant weaknesses in its 
review of the initial design of the OSiRIS access control system. 
 
1 Engagement Process 
After initial discussions with CTSC staff, representatives of the ​MI-OSiRIS​ project submitted a 
CTSC engagement application in June 2016. From August to October 2016, CTSC and OSiRIS 
staff developed the engagement plan, with the goal of conducting a joint design review of the 
OSiRIS Access Assertion (OAA) system. CTSC staff conducted the engagement from October 
2016 to March 2017 via a series of hour-long phone calls with OSiRIS staff to discuss and review 
the OAA design. This report documents the outcomes of those discussions. 
 
OAA design documents​ were the primary source materials used in the review. At the time of 
the review, the OAA system was in an early design and implementation phase, giving the group 
the opportunity to consider a variety of design options and give input to design decisions, in 
contrast to an after-the-fact security evaluation of an implemented system. 
 
2 Factual Summary 
MI-OSiRIS​ (Multi-Institutional Open Storage Research Infrastructure) is a pilot project funded by 
the NSF CC*DNI DIBBs program to evaluate a software-defined storage infrastructure for the 
primary Michigan research universities. OSiRIS is building a distributed, multi-institutional 
storage infrastructure that will allow researchers at any of three Michigan research university 
campuses to read, write, manage and share their data directly from their computing facility 
locations. The OSiRIS Access Assertion (OAA) system performs data access control in OSiRIS, 
using SAML for authentication and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) for authorization. 
2.1 OSiRIS Use Cases 
The engagement team discussed two categories of use cases for the OSiRIS system: 1) 
distributed access to scientific data using ​Ceph​ and 2) network discovery, monitoring, and 
management using ​perfSONAR​ for reliable and high-performance use of Ceph across the 
network. The former target science users, and the latter target network engineers. The OSiRIS 
design includes a common authentication and authorization mechanism across these use cases, 
supporting federated campus authentication via Internet2's ​InCommon​ service and 
group-based access control (with delegated sub-groups) using Internet2's ​COmanage​ software. 
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Ceph provides three core interfaces: object store (S3 API), block device, and filesystem. An 
OSiRIS web portal enables users to obtain access to these Ceph interfaces and manage access 
control. Users first set up access via their web browser, then access Ceph interfaces outside the 
browser, via filesystem mounts, REST APIs, command-line tools, and other applications. OSiRIS 
also provides Globus endpoints for data sharing/transfer outside the Ceph cluster(s). 
 
OSiRIS manages access to scientific data following the virtual organization (VO) model. OSiRIS 
operators establish a VO for each supported science domain/project and allocate storage to 
that VO. VOs manage their own membership, including defining groups for access control. 
System administrators on shared compute clusters configure Ceph mount points for the VOs 
that use those clusters, so their compute jobs can access the scientific data according to VO 
authorization. Science users typically access Ceph via direct mount or S3 API from these shared 
compute clusters as well as leverage Globus and/or other local mechanisms to transfer data 
to/from their desktop and the clusters. 
 
The Network Management Abstraction Layer (​NMAL​) gives network engineers the ability to 
view operational network information and launch network probes for network discovery and 
performance analysis. The group of network engineers that support the OSiRIS operational 
infrastructure form their own virtual organization which determines access rights to the NMAL 
capabilities. Access control ensures that detailed network topology information and the ability 
to launch potentially disruptive network probes is restricted to the trusted group of network 
engineers. 
2.2 Use of Internet2 COmanage 
Internet2's ​COmanage​ software is a collaboration management platform that enables virtual 
organizations (VOs) to manage groups and roles via extensible enrollment and provisioning 
workflows. COmanage is multi-tenant, supporting multiple Collaborative Organizations (COs) 
each with independent user memberships, Collaborative Organization Units (COUs), groups, 
and roles. To support collaboration across VOs, OSiRIS plans to configure one CO in COmanage 
with a COU for each science VO. That will enable scientists to enroll once in the OSiRIS CO then 
join OSiRIS VOs (COUs) according to VO policies and procedures set by VO (COU) 
administrators. 
 
COmanage implements a central component of the OAA design. Science users and 
administrators use COmanage to define the groups and roles that control access to their 
scientific data. Likewise, network administrators define groups and roles in COmanage to 
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control access to sensitive network data and probes. The Internet2 ​Shibboleth​ software 
authenticates users to COmanage, allowing scientists and network administrators to log in 
using their campus credentials via the InCommon federation. COmanage provisions user and 
group information to LDAP for use by other components of the OAA system (described below). 
2.3 OAA Design 
The OSiRIS Access Assertion (OAA) system consists of two main components: 1) a Resource 
Authority (RA) that issues digitally signed OSiRIS Access Grants (OAGs) and OSiRIS Access 
Assertions (OAAs) for access to the resource(s) it controls, and 2) a Central Authority (CA) that 
issues OSiRIS Access Requests (OARs) on behalf of users to RAs, stores OAAs signed by RAs, and 
issues digitally signed OSiRIS Access Tokens (OATs) and OSiRIS Refresh Tokens (ORTs) containing 
OAAs. 
 
OAR OSiRIS Access Request 
OAG OSiRIS Access Grant 
OAA OSiRIS Access Assertion 
OAT OSiRIS Access Token 
ORT OSiRIS Refresh Token 
Table 1. There are five OSiRIS token types. 
 
The CA integrates with COmanage to obtain user group/role information to include in OARs. 
Based on the user's identity, groups, and roles, the RA issues OAGs indicating what resources 
are available to the user. The OAG includes the "sub" or subject to which access is being 
granted, the "kind" of access (e.g., read or write), and the "resource" available for access (e.g., 
Ceph mount point). The subject of the OAG may be one or more named individuals, groups, or 
roles. 
 
The OAA system uses concepts from OAuth (​RFC6749​), including JSON Web Tokens (​RFC7519​) 
and the practice of issuing shorter-lived access tokens and longer-lived refresh tokens. This fact 
inspired the engagement team to use the OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations 
(​RFC6819​) as an evaluation framework for the OAA system, as documented in the next section. 
2.4 OAA Threat Model Analysis 
In applying the RFC 6819 Threat Model to the OAA design we made the following observations: 
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● OAA clients (e.g., mount.osiris) are analogous to OAuth public clients, since users run 
OAA clients directly rather than accessing OSiRIS resources via a third-party web 
application. This is in contrast to OAuth confidential clients, which have their own 
credentials that are independent of the credentials of the user or resource owner. For 
this reason our RFC 6819 analysis did not consider topics specific to confidential clients. 
● OAA's CA is analogous to OAuth's Authorization Server, which authenticates the user 
and issues access/refresh tokens. 
● OAA's RA is analogous to OAuth's Resource Server, which grants access to resources 
based on the contents of the client's access tokens. 
 
This correspondence between OAA components and OAuth components enabled a relatively 
straightforward application of the RFC 6819 threat model to OAA, with considerations for 
clients (RFC 6819 Section 4.1), user authorization (RFC 6819 Section 4.2), token issuance (RFC 
6819 Section 4.3), client authorization (RFC 6819 Section 4.4), token refresh (RFC 6819 Section 
4.5), and resource access (RFC 6819 Section 4.6). 
 
Client threats primarily deal with exposure of tokens due to compromised or malicious clients. 
Based on ​RFC 6819 Section 4.1​ recommendations we made the following observations: 
● While OAA clients, being "public", do not have their own secrets, it would still be 
valuable for clients to locally generate and maintain a unique client identifier to prevent 
accidental misuse by one client of tokens issued to a different client. 
● OAA's CA should include the ability to revoke OATs/ORTs in case of client compromise. 
● OAGs, being authorization tokens rather than impersonation tokens, have the ability to 
limit token scope (i.e., following the principle of least privilege). As an implementation 
matter, RAs should not issue OAGs with overly broad privileges, to limit the impact of a 
client compromise. 
● Keep OATs in transient memory to protect from disclosure. Use ORTs to obtain new 
OATs as needed. 
● Follow the recommendations from the ​OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps​ specification. 
 
User authorization threats focus on the process of the user authenticating to the system and 
obtaining authorization for the client to access resources. Based on ​RFC 6819 Section 4.2 
recommendations we made the following observations: 
● Use of InCommon federated authentication leverages existing university anti-phishing 
countermeasures. Universities train users to enter campus passwords only at a 
well-known campus identity provider. Also, many InCommon members are now 
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deploying multi-factor authentication at their identity providers. OAA use of SAML Web 
Browser Single Sign-On via InCommon avoids introducing OSiRIS-specific phishing risks. 
● To protect against users unintentionally granting too much scope (privileges) to clients: 
○ Careful implementation effort should be applied to the OAA user consent 
interface, to clearly explain to the user what access is being requested/granted. 
○ The CA should include sanity checks on scope requests based on client 
characteristics, e.g., it makes sense for a mount.osiris client to request 
read/write access but not shell access. 
 
Threats to the token issuance process include eavesdropping attacks and compromise of the 
token server. Based on ​RFC 6819 Section 4.3​ recommendations we made the following 
observations: 
● Require TLS to protect against token disclosure by network eavesdropping attacks. For 
non-browser clients, take special care to keep TLS configurations/libraries up-to-date. 
The current OAA implementation relies on Perl's mozilla-ca package for this. 
● To protect against compromise of secrets on the CA (token server): 
○ Avoid storing secrets when possible, e.g., store token IDs/hashes for validity 
checking but do not store sensitive token contents after issuance. 
○ Carefully protect the CA's signing key. Support CA signing key revocation. 
Periodically update the CA signing key using a graceful key roll-over scheme (e.g., 
storing "previous" signing certificates in LDAP). 
 
Threats to client authorization include malicious client software and browser-based attacks. 
Based on ​RFC 6819 Section 4.4​ recommendations we make the following observations: 
● To protect against malicious client software, the CA should prompt the user for consent 
when requesting client authorization. 
● Prevent clickjacking by using X-FRAME-OPTIONS or JavaScript frame-busting in web 
interfaces. 
● To protect against abuse of browser sessions, consider notifying users by an alternate 
method (email, text) for significant events (initial registration, new authorizations 
granted). Make notifications configurable so they can be adjusted based on usage and 
do not become annoying. 
● Give users the ability to view the status of their current valid tokens and information 
about the clients they are issued to, so conscientious users can detect and report 
compromises and proactively revoke tokens that are no longer needed. 
● To prevent exhaustion of resources, place configurable limits on the number of requests 
per user and resource. 
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Due to the longer validity period of refresh tokens, additional mitigations are recommended in 
RFC 6819 Section 4.5​. Specifically for ORTs we make the following observations: 
● Bind ORTs to client identity information to make use by other clients more difficult. 
Consider IP-binding of ORTs for clients with stable IP addresses (e.g., not mobile or using 
NAT). 
● To proactively protect against misuse of old ORTs, re-issue fresh refresh tokens upon 
use. 
 
When accessing protected resources, threats include malicious resource providers, denial of 
service attacks, and disclosure of sensitive information. Based on ​RFC 6819 Section 4.6 
recommendations we make the following observations: 
● To prevent misuse of bearer tokens by malicious resource providers, clients should 
verify the resource URI in the token matches the address of the resource before using a 
token with that resource. 
● Use the resource provider's public key to encrypt any sensitive data included in bearer 
tokens. 
● For OAGs that allocate consumable resources, track token serial numbers to prevent 
overuse by replay attacks. 
● Use HTTP cache-control headers to minimize risk of token exposure from HTTP caches. 
● Do not log sensitive parameters. Use POST instead of GET for sensitive operations, 
because GET parameters are often logged by HTTP servers. 
 
2.5 OAA Integrations: Ceph, NMAL 
CTSC and OSiRIS staff also discussed scenarios for Ceph and NMAL integration with OAA to 
understand how the OAA functionality will meet Ceph and NMAL access control needs. 
 
OSiRIS plans to integrate OAA with Ceph via a gatekeeper web service that consumes OAA 
tokens and creates ephemeral Ceph access keys to grant access at the Ceph layer. The 
mount.osiris client interacts with a OAA client service daemon process to obtain OAA tokens 
from the CA (if tokens aren't already cached) then interacts with the gatekeeper service to 
obtain Ceph access keys (over HTTPS). Then mount.osiris can call mount.ceph to mount the 
filesystem using the ephemeral Ceph access keys. 
 
OAA can be integrated directly into the NMAL web applications (Unified Network Information 
Service, Basic Lightweight Periscope Probes, etc.). NMAL access control will be primarily at the 
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REST endpoint layer (e.g., /services, /metadata, /measurements, etc.). Since NMAL includes 
network collection agents, running as persistent services, it needs support from OAA for 
long-lived refresh tokens with "robot" or service identities. These robot identities can be 
managed via COmanage and provisioned to a separate LDAP search base to keep them separate 
from OSiRIS user identities. 
 
Overall, the group found that the OAA design provides the functionality and interfaces needed 
for Ceph and NMAL integration.  
 
3 Recommendations 
We supplement the RFC 6819 threat assessment with the following general recommendations: 
● Apply standard operational security controls to OAA services, with special focus on 
protecting the Central Authority's signing key(s). Consult CTSC's ​Security Commodity IT 
in Scientific CI Projects: Baseline Controls and Best Practices​ for guidance. 
● This design review is not a substitute for a comprehensive cybersecurity program. 
CTSC's ​Guide to Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Science and Engineering 
Projects​ provides recommendations and templates. 
● For cases where science users do not have a home campus identity provider (IdP) that is 
part of the InCommon federation, recommend use of an unaffiliated IdP or IdP of Last 
Resort (IoLR). The ​REFEDS IoLR working group​ provides a list. 
● OSiRIS should consider applying for a follow-on ​CTSC engagement​ after implementation 
is complete, to review design changes that occurred during implementation and initial 
deployment. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Conducting this review early in the design phase of OSiRIS Access Assertions enabled a 
collaborative exchange between CTSC and OSiRIS staff, resulting in a design that follows 
IETF-developed recommendations and addresses a comprehensive threat model. We expect 
the recommendations in this report to be applicable to other collaborative scientific computing 
infrastructures that share similarities with OSiRIS. 
 
OSiRIS open source software can be found at ​https://github.com/MI-OSiRIS​.  
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